Key Takeaways
- The podcast challenges the official 9/11 narrative, claiming it misrepresents intelligence failures.
- A former FBI agent alleges the CIA knew 9/11 hijackers were in the U.S.
- The CIA is accused of obstructing FBI efforts to apprehend two future 9/11 hijackers.
- Assertions suggest the CIA attempted a "false-flag" recruitment operation with hijackers.
- The 9/11 Commission report is described as a cover-up, blocking key investigations.
Deep Dive
- The episode asserts the official 9/11 story of government intelligence failures is a "lie" perpetuated for 24 years.
- The series aims to advocate for a new, independent 9/11 investigation, free from partisan and foreign influence.
- Findings suggest former CIA Director John Brennan played a role in facilitating hijackers' U.S. arrival.
- The CIA is accused of obstructing the FBI's efforts to apprehend future 9/11 hijackers.
- In late 1999, the CIA and NSA tracked Khalid Al-Medhar, a future 9/11 hijacker, via the Hada Home switchboard in Yemen.
- Al-Medhar traveled to Dubai, then Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, for a January 5, 2000, Al-Qaeda meeting, which the NSA confirmed.
- The CIA allegedly knew Al-Medhar had a U.S. visa after searching his room in Dubai; John Brennan, then CIA station chief in Riyadh, was reportedly aware.
- FBI agent Mark Rossini reports that CIA officer Michael Ann Casey obstructed efforts to share this intelligence with the FBI.
- CIA surveillance reported Al-Madhar and Nawaf al-Hazmi flying to Los Angeles in April 2000, but did not inform the FBI.
- The host questions why the CIA would hide their arrival, referencing a claim by Richard Clarke that the CIA was running a 'false flag operation' to recruit the hijackers.
- It is suggested that the CIA's actions stemmed from a plan by Cofer Black, former CIA counterterrorism chief, to recruit sources within Al-Qaeda.
- The guest suggests the CIA had a 'delusional grand plan' to recruit individuals from the Kuala Lumpur meeting, including Al-Madhar and Al-Hazmi.
- The 9/11 Commission's explanation for the CIA's actions was an 'honest mistake,' describing the CIA's strategy as 'zone defense' versus the FBI's 'man-to-man.'
- The CIA allegedly blocked commission investigators from speaking with agents involved in the recruitment plot, and its director of operations kept a key operative away.
- A Saudi operative, Omar al-Bayoumi, allegedly recruited 9/11 hijackers, bypassing FBI notification due to domestic spying restrictions, and helped them move to San Diego.
- The 9/11 Commission report is claimed to be a cover-up, with Philip Zelico allegedly making a secret agreement to block investigator access to certain records.
- Khalid al-Midhar re-entered the U.S. unhindered on July 4, 2001, despite Saudi intelligence allegedly identifying him as a threat.
- The majority of the 19 hijackers obtained U.S. visas from the American consulate in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, run by John Brennan at the time.
- Days before al-Midhar's re-entry, the CIA allegedly refused to identify him from a photograph to the FBI, despite a meeting discussing the USS Cole bombing.
- The FBI's investigation into Zacharias Moussaoui was hampered by restrictions on searching his laptop and room, despite him receiving funds from a contact also sending money to hijackers.