America’s Very Weird Religious Future

Key Takeaways

American secularization plateaued around 2020, with non-religious individuals stable at 30%.
Religious participation among Gen Z shows women leaving institutions faster than men.
American religiosity is increasingly concentrated among educated, upper-middle-class individuals.
Mainline Protestantism has experienced a dramatic, long-term decline over 70 years.
Non-denominational Christianity, evangelical in theology, is America's fastest-growing religious segment.
The internet is seen as detrimental to religion, while in-person communal practice remains vital.

The 'nones' (atheist, agnostic, or nothing in particular) grew from 5% in 1972 to 30% of Americans, but this trend plateaued around 2020.
The share of non-religious Americans has remained stable at approximately 30% for the past five years, with Christians at 63-65%.
A 'bedrock' of resilient religiosity exists in America, unlike other Western countries, after societal stigma against disaffiliation lessened.
While religious attendance is declining, belief in God remains more resilient in the U.S. compared to Western Europe, even among non-attenders.

Historically, women have been more religious than men across various traditions, but this is shifting among younger generations.
Data indicates that among Gen Z, women are leaving religious institutions at a faster rate than men, leading to near-equal religiosity between genders.
A 50-50 gender split in religious institutions could potentially benefit community building and increase marriage rates.
Despite potential shifts in congregational balance, leadership in major denominations like evangelicalism and Catholicism remains predominantly male.

More educated Americans, particularly those with bachelor's degrees and incomes between $60,000 and $100,000, are more likely to attend church.
This trend contrasts with European patterns where less educated individuals are more religiously active, suggesting a concentration among the U.S. upper-middle class.
Interest in non-Christian and post-Christian spiritualities like tarot, astrology, and witchcraft has significantly increased, visible in retail spaces.
While some identify as spiritual but not religious, data from 12,000 non-religious individuals does not show spirituality replacing religion, but rather a move towards 'nothing'.

The decline of the Protestant mainline is identified as a significant factor in contemporary American polarization, removing a societal centering force.
One pastor's rural American Baptist church declined from over 300 members in the 1960s to fewer than 12 by 2024, leading to its closure.
Mainline Protestantism has been in 'freefall' for 70 years, declining from over half of Americans in the 1950s to a current rate of 8.5%.
Decline is attributed to aging congregations and a loss of distinctiveness, as mainline churches adopted broader American values compared to evangelicals.

Political polarization is closely linked to church attendance, with Southern Baptists, for example, being 80% Republican.
Religion is increasingly becoming a tribal identifier, often coded as conservative, with liberals more likely to be non-religious.
Politics often infiltrates churches from congregants, even when pastors avoid overt political statements.
The Catholic Church attempts to maintain a 'consistent ethic of life' to remain above politics, despite a politically divided congregation.

A lack of certainty in core Christian doctrines, such as the resurrection and miracles, among clergy and congregants contributes to mainline decline.
This contrasts with evangelical churches, which maintain a more explicit focus on core tenets.
A shift towards certainty in core religious doctrines among previously more liberal clergy could potentially revitalize religious belief.
The decline of mainline Protestant churches has removed a historical meeting place for diverse views, leading to a lack of welcoming outlets for those open to belief but not specific doctrines.

Non-denominational Christianity is the fastest-growing segment of religiously affiliated Americans, expanding from 3% in 1972 to 15% currently.
These churches are largely evangelical in theology and practice, but are characterized as anti-institutional and distrustful of centralized authority.
This trend leads to a fragmented religious landscape of independent congregations, complicating the analysis of evangelicalism.
Many non-denominational churches have Pentecostal leanings, emphasizing supernatural elements like prophecy and healing, a shift from older mainline practices.

Immigration and ethnicity are impacting religious demographics, with Hispanic Catholics moving into Pentecostalism and diverse congregations forming in non-denominational churches.
Concerns exist about the ability of non-Christian immigrant religions (e.g., Hinduism, Islam, Buddhism) to grow without continued immigration, given declining fertility rates.
The Amish are presented as an anomaly with high fertility rates, projected to have a significant population in parts of Indiana and Pennsylvania by 2075.
Despite potential local political influence from Amish growth, historical patterns suggest challenges in maintaining cohesion and growth rates for larger religious groups.

The rise of 'trad cath' (traditionalist Catholic) movements is noted as an interesting trend with potential for growth due to high birth rates among adherents.
Mainline denominations, like the Episcopalians and United Methodists, are exploring revitalization through church planting and mergers, leveraging existing institutional heft.
The Anglican Church North America, a conservative offshoot, shows sustained growth and could see significant expansion by 2050.
The internet is argued to be destructive to religion by highlighting inconsistencies, with online church during COVID failing to replicate in-person communal benefits.